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PREVIEW; State v. Christensen: Can Practitioners, in the Face
of the Opioid Epidemic, be Convicted for Distribution of
Dangerous Drugs Under Montana Law?
Holly C. Suek*
The Montana Supreme Court is scheduled to hear oral
argument in this matter on Friday, April 3, 2020, at 9:30 a.m. in the
Courtroom of the Montana Supreme Court, Joseph P. Mazurek
Justice Building, Helena, Montana. The oral arguments are closed
to the public but will be available via live stream on the Court’s
website.1 Assistant Attorney General C. Mark Fowler is likely to
appear for the Appellee and Joshua S. Van De Wetering is likely to
appear for the Appellant.
I.

INTRODUCTION

The threshold issue of this case is one of statutory
interpretation and applying the law to the case of a physician; the
necessary approach for respecting and adhering to the separation of
powers of the judicial and legislative branches. This case presents
the issue of whether a “practitioner,” here, a licensed physician, may
be convicted of criminal distribution of dangerous drugs under
Montana law for his prescribing practices.2 The Montana Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the Montana criminal distribution statute,3
as applied to physicians, will have important implications in the
future for application in the courts, including possibly calling for the
Legislature to pass new legislation. In conjunction, this case also
presents the issue of whether the district court fully and fairly
instructed the jury on drug distribution under Montana law when the
court modeled the instructions after the Ninth Circuit due to the lack
of precedent at the state level.4

*

Holly C. Suek, J.D./M.B.A. Candidate 2020, Alexander Blewett III School
of Law at the University of Montana.
1
http://stream.vision.net/MT-JUD/
2
See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 2, State v. Christensen (Mont. July 17,
2019) (No. DA18-0268); Appellee’s Response Brief at 1, State v. Christensen
(Mont. Jan. 21, 2020) (No. DA 18-0268).
3
MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–9–101 (2019).
4
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 3; Appellee’s Response Brief,
supra note 1, at 1.
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Although this preview focuses on the above-mentioned
issues, there are a handful of other issues being raised on appeal,
including: whether Montana’s criminal endangerment statute5 is
unconstitutionally vague as applied to physicians prescribing
controlled substances; whether the district court erred when the
court admitted character evidence without holding a 404(b)
evidentiary hearing; whether the court erred in refusing the defense
to put on character witnesses in order to present a complete defense;
and whether the State presented enough evidence to convict
Christensen, the appellant-practitioner.6
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

2011 marked the beginning of Chris Arthur Christensen’s
work as a physician in Florence Montana, where he operated as a
general practice, with some focus placed on services for pain
management through prescribing controlled substances.7 In 2014
local, state, and federal authorities conducted a search of
Christensen’s clinic and home pursuant to search warrants, and
obtained 4,718 patient files.8 These files revealed Christensen’s
prescribing practices, including his review of prior medical records,
extent of examinations of his patients before prescribing, monitoring
of patients and where his patients geographically were from.9
On August 19, 2015, the State charged Christensen with 396
drug related crimes including charges of criminal distribution of
dangerous drugs, criminal possession of dangerous drugs, criminal
endangerment, and negligent homicide.10 The charges were
amended in October 2017, to 11 counts of criminal distribution, nine
counts of criminal endangerment, and two counts of negligent
homicide.11

5

MONT. CODE. ANN. § 45–9–102 (2019).
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 3; Appellee’s Response Brief,
supra note 1, at 1.
7
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 3; Appellee’s Response Brief,
supra note 1, at 2.
8
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at 2–3.
9
Id. at 3.
10
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 3.
11
Id. at 4.
6

2019

PREVIEW: State v. Christensen

83

The trial focused on 11 of Christensen’s patients; nine were
present and testified, and two are deceased.12 Christensen wrote
prescriptions for the 11 patients, with many of the prescriptions
being for opiates, which are Schedule II controlled substances
(dangerous drugs).13 After a four week trial, ending November 20,
2017, the jury convicted Christensen on all counts and the district
court later sentenced him to 20 years in Montana State Prison, with
ten years suspended.14 Christensen now appeals the decision of the
Montana Twenty-First Judicial District Court, Ravalli County, and
his sentence was stayed pending the outcome of this appeal.15
III.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A. Appellant’s Argument

Appellant argues Christensen cannot be prosecuted under
Montana’s criminal distribution of dangerous drugs statute for two
reasons: (1) the statute provides an exemption for practitioners
acting in the course of a professional practice, which Appellant
contends Christensen was doing; and (2) the distribution statute does
not apply to the action of prescribing, because the definitions of
“distribution,” “sell,” “barter,” “exchange,” or “give away” do not
equate to, or encompass prescribe.16 Appellant does not argue that
physicians can never be prosecuted, just not for prescribing.17
Additionally, if a practitioner engages in distribution actions of
dangerous drugs outside of their professional practice, they may be
criminally liable.18
Appellant asserts Montana’s criminal distribution of
dangerous drugs statute differs from the applicable federal law
under the Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”).19 To the same end,
Appellant argues the district court erred when it modeled jury
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at 3.
See generally Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 9–15; MONT.
CODE ANN. § 50–32–202 (2019); Id. § 50–32–224.
14
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 4.
15
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at 2.
16
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 19–22.
17
Appellant’s Reply Brief at 2, State v. Christensen (Mont. March 13, 2020)
(No. DA18-0268).
18
Id.
19
21 U.S.C. § 841 (2018).
12
13
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instructions from United States v. Feingold,20 a Ninth Circuit case
applying federal law.21 Additionally, even if modeling its jury
instructions after the Ninth Circuit’s was proper, the district court
did not “fully” instruct the jury because the court did not give an
instruction on heightened mens rea—intent—as required by the
Ninth Circuit.22 Rather, the Appellant argues the district court only
instructed on the lesser standard, “knowingly.”23
B. Appellee’s Argument
The State argues the distribution statute applies to
physicians—and to Christensen in particular—because Christensen
was not acting in the course of a professional practice when he
prescribed dangerous drugs, “freely and liberally . . . at the victims’
choices and whims.”24
Addressing jury instruction concerns, the State asserts the
jury instructions applying to criminal distribution were full and fair,
regardless of whether every Feingold principle was instructed on
within one instruction, or if the applicable law of the case at issue is
covered when the instructions are read together as a whole.25 The
State argues the jury was instructed to convict Christensen under
criminal liability—which requires heightened mens rea—and not
under the lesser civil malpractice showing.26 The State refers to Jury
Instruction No. 24,27 which directed the jury on the “good faith”
defense, “that it must find that if the prescribing practitioner had a
legitimate medical purpose, as defined not only by the
‘practitioner’s sincere intent towards his patient’ but also by the
practitioner’s ‘honest effort to prescribe for a patient’s condition in
accordance with the standard of medical practice,’” then the
practitioner is exempt from conviction.28

20

454 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2006).
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 17.
22
Id. at 40.
23
Appellant’s Reply Brief, supra note 16, at 8.
24
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at 8, 39.
25
Id. at 17.
26
Id. at 14–16.
27
See Id. at 14.
28
Id. at 15.
21
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ANALYSIS

A. Applicability of Mont. Code Ann. § 45–9–101 to
Practitioner Prescribing
The Montana Supreme Court’s decision will likely turn on a
threshold inquiry of whether the criminal distribution of dangerous
drugs statute contemplates the act of “prescribing.” If the Court
decides prescribing is within the scope of the statute, the next
inquiry will likely be whether all practitioners are exempt from the
statue, or instead, only those practitioners “acting in the course of a
professional practice.” The parties disagree on the interpretation of
the statute.
Under the general principles of statutory interpretation, the
Montana Supreme Court will not, “insert that which the legislature
omitted, nor [will it] omit that which the legislature has inserted.”29
Appellee argues the statute is clear and the only inquiry necessary is
whether Christensen was acting in the course of a professional
practice when he prescribed dangerous drugs to his patients.30
Even if the Montana Legislature “borrowed heavily” from
the CSA for guidance in drafting controlled substance statutes—as
argued by the State—differences between the CSA and Montana’s
criminal distribution statute exist.31 Importantly, the CSA does not
limit the prohibited acts solely to acts under the umbrella of
“distribute,” as the Montana criminal distribution statute does.32
In contrast to the Montana criminal distribution statute, the
CSA makes it unlawful, “for any person knowingly or intentionally
(1) to manufacture, distribute, or dispense . . . a controlled
substance.”33 The word “dispense” is not incorporated in the
Montana criminal distribution statute. Furthermore, the words
“distribute” and “dispense” are defined as separate from one another
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 21 (quoting MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 1–2–101 (2019)).
30
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra at 8.
31
See Id. at 8–9 (citing State ex rel. Lance v. Dist. Court, 542 P.2d 1211
(1975); State v. Pirello, 282 P.3d 662 (2012)).
32
See 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2018); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–9–101 (2019).
33
21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (emphasis added).
29
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in the Montana statutory scheme.34 The “dispense” definition
encapsulates prescribing, whereas “distribute” does not.35
Since instructional legislative history on the statute is
nonexistent, the Court may agree with the Appellant and decide the
act of prescribing is not contemplated in the Montana distribution
statute. In that case, Christensen (or any practitioner) may not be
convicted for his actions of prescribing under the statute’s current
language. Thus, under this interpretation the Court will dismiss
Christensen’s 11 convictions for distribution of dangerous drugs for
his actions of prescribing. The implications of this interpretation
require legislative action, as the Court is unable to insert “prescribe”
into the statute. If the Montana legislature intends to criminalize
actions by physicians for prescribing for non-legitimate purposes,
the legislature may do so by passing new legislation for prescribing
or dispensing, as other states have recently done.36
Alternatively, should the Court agree with the State, such a
decision would seem to necessarily imply the act of prescribing falls
within the definition of one or more of the following: “distribution,”
“sell,” “barter,” “exchange,” or “give away,” as laid out in the
Montana criminal distribution statute. If so, the Court also must
determine whether Christensen’s prescribing efforts were within the
course of his professional practice. Although the phrase “within the
course of professional practice” in the Montana distribution statute
is not defined, it was modeled after the CSA. Thus, the Court might
look to both state and federal law for guidance.37 Additional
guidance may be gleaned from 21 C.F.R. § 1306.04, providing that
34
See MONT. CODE ANN. § 45–9–101(a); Id. § 50–32–101(10) “‘Dispense’
means to deliver a dangerous drug. . .by or pursuant to the lawful order of a
practitioner, including prescribing, administering. . .” (emphasis added); Id. § 50–
32–101(12) “‘Distribute’ means to deliver other than by administering or
dispensing a dangerous drug” (emphasis added).
35
Id.
36
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 30–31; see Id. at 23–24.
37
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 26; e.g. U.S. v. Moore, 423 U.S.
122, 123–124 (1975) (The issue presented was whether a person who are
registered under the CSA can be prosecuted under 21 U.S.C. § 841 for dispensing
or distributing controlled substances. Additionally, the Court said, “the scheme of
the CSA, viewed against the background of the legislative history, reveals an
intent to limit a registered physician’s dispensing authority to the course of his
‘professional practice.”).
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a practitioner shall be subject to penalties relating to controlled
substances if the prescriptions were written and issued without a
legitimate medical purpose.38
B. Criminal Distribution & the Practitioner Exception Jury
Instructions
Beyond the threshold issue of statutory applicability, the
Court’s decision of whether the district court fully and fairly
instructed the jury on each element of the crimes presented will
hinge on the determined appropriate mens rea. Despite the Montana
criminal distribution statute not mentioning “good faith,” was the
district court required to instruct on such; if so, did they?
The mens rea requirement is connected to the practitioner
exception language of the statute—acting inside the course of a
professional practice. Christensen puts significant weight on the
need to provide a jury instruction on intent (for acting outside of the
course of a professional business).39 “Good faith” and “intent” in
this instance go hand-in-hand. The Ninth Circuit, whom the district
court relied upon, required instructions on “good faith” to ensure if
a jury rendered a conviction, they did so after contemplating the
heightened mens rea requirement and not just the lesser requirement
for malpractice standard.40 The parties disagree as to whether the
district court gave (an) instruction(s) for “intent” or “good faith.”41
The Court will determine if the jury instructions on criminal
distribution were fully and fairly given, regardless of whether the
word “intent” was used. It would be improper for the Court to judge

Feingold, 454 F.3d at 1003–04; “Thus, a physician remains criminally liable
when he ceases to distribute or dispense controlled substances as a medical
professional, and acts instead as a ‘pusher’” Id. (internal citations omitted).
39
Appellant’s Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 43–45.
40
Id. at 41–43; “A controlled substance is distributed by a practitioner in the
usual course of his professional practice if the substance is distributed by him in
good faith in medically treating a patient. Good faith is not merely a practitioner’s
sincere intention towards the people who come to see him, but, rather, it involves
his sincerity in attempting to conduct himself in accordance with a standard of
medical practice generally recognized and accepted in the country.” Id. at 42–43.
41
Id. at 44; Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at 14–15.
38
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a jury instruction in isolation. Rather, the Court should determine if
the instructions, as a whole, state the applicable law of the case.42
Although district courts are given broad discretion when
instructing the jury, the Court may find the district court did not fully
and fairly instruct the jury on criminal distribution of dangerous
drugs if the Court determines the given instructions, “prejudicially
affect the defendant’s substantial rights.”43 The implication of that
finding is reversible error.44 However, the Court cannot find the
instructions prejudicial if read in their entirety, the set of jury
instruction state the applicable law of the case and crimes at hand.45
Alternatively, the Court may determine that any
“imprecision” of the jury instructions was harmless and uphold the
convictions for distribution. Any imprecision would be evident in
the word choice of the instructions; thus, the Court will look to
whether the words used instructed the jury to consider Christensen’s
mental state, and if “purposely and knowingly” is sufficient for
heightened mens rea.46
V.

CONCLUSION

The Court will likely dismiss Christensen’s convictions
under the criminal distribution of dangerous drugs statute because
his actions of prescribing controlled substances is not within the
bounds of the definition of “distribution.” Additionally, for future
similarly situated practitioners engaged in the act of prescribing,
they would not be susceptible to conviction under the statute as
written. Although case law and legislative history is sparse or
nonexistent on the matter, the Court’s decision will likely be
justified by adherence to the strict rules of statutory interpretation
and by applying the plain meaning of the words used in the statute.
Alternatively, if the Court does not dismiss Christensen’s
criminal distribution convictions based on statutory interpretation,
42

See Tarlton v. Kaufman, 199 P.3d 263, 267 (2008).
State v. Williams, 358 P.3d 127, 129 (2015) (internal citations omitted).
44
Id.
45
Appellee’s Response Brief, supra note 1, at 18.
46
The State argues the words “purposely and knowingly” were used in order
to “wed” the relied upon federal jury instructions to the Montana law. Id. at 16.
43
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the convictions will likely stand because the jury was fully and fairly
instructed on the law of the case, although these types of instructions
go beyond existing Montana law.
Lastly, Christensen’s other convictions—negligent
homicide and criminal endangerment—are outside the purview of
this preview.

